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Abstract:This paper explores the notion of hospitality and faith in Derrida and Kier-
kegaard. The aim is to trace the topological core of existence in relation to an ongoing 
debate in contemporary continental philosophy of religion about khôra. The paper 
shows how khôral traces are at work in Kierkegaard’s thinking in relation to the topo-
logical proximity of love. The claim is that Kierkegaard emphasizes the vulnerability 
rather than the hostility of what I coin khôral love as the vibrating space between the 
anonymous and the amorous, call and response. The unknown X of the khôral beco-
mes the topos of existence – the “stepping out”, the “you are here (X)”. A “you” called 
forth by the commandment of love or the visitation of the stranger.
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Resumen: Este artículo explora la noción de hospitalidad y fe en Derrida y Kierke-
gaard. El objetivo es rastrear el núcleo topológico de la existencia en relación con un 
debate en curso en la filosofía continental contemporánea de la religión sobre khôra. 
El artículo muestra cómo operan las huellas khôral en el pensamiento de Kierkegaard 
en relación con la proximidad topológica del amor. La tesis es que Kierkegaard enfa-
tiza la vulnerabilidad más que la hostilidad de lo que denomono amor khôral como 
espacio vibrante entre lo anónimo y lo amoroso, entre la llamada y la respuesta. La X 
desconocida del khôral se convierte en el topos de la existencia: el “salir”, el “estás aquí 
(X)”. Un “tú” llamado por el mandamiento del amor o la visitación del extraño. 
Palabras clave: LUGAR; KHÔRA; HOSPITALIDAD; FE; AMOR; FILOSOFÍA EXIS-
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God After the Death of God
Deicide! The crime to end all crimes. An impossible felony. Impos-
sible to execute, imposible to solve. What would an autopsy reveal? What 
would the obituary notice look like? Like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra maybe. 
We might file the case under B620-B659 like in Kant’s first Critique concer-
ning the impossibility of different proofs of the existence of God. So, is God 
dead? Did God not die on the cross? Was the Cartesian God not executed by 
the Kantian guillotine of reason, or by Nietzsche’s lion-spirit? Or by all 
of us? The death of God seems to create a gab, a possibility of new gods to 
arrive, or the risk of old ones to mutate and rise from the grave, like Nietzs-
che’s dragon-god. At the end of the Zarathustra, it prophetically says that 
one day mightier dragons will rise again (KSA 4: 185). Maybe greater and 
more powerful feline spirits will too – “the wild cats must become tigers 
(ibid)”- in order to slay these shiny idol-reptiles in an endless” twilight of the 
Hydras”?
So, what happens after the death of God, or the death of a certain 
kind of God? What God? The God of onto-theology, that is! As Caputo puts 
it: “God as a Highest Being – a steady hand at the wheel of the universe, 
ordering all things to good purpose, the  spanning providential eye o’er-
seeing – has had a good run” (Caputo 2013: IX). The gap opened by the 
death of the old God of metaphysics makes room to rethink God after the 
death of God like Nietzsche’s Dionysus, Heidegger’s last god, Marion’s God 
without Being, Kearney’s God who may be, Derrida’s tout autre and Capu-
to’s insisting call of the event of a weak perhaps. In his postmodern theology 
or “theopoetics”, Caputo thinks of God, not as a mighty-being, but a “might 
be”, not an Omnipotent supreme being, but an “Omni- possibilizing “weak 
force, a weak call of the event of what we cannot see coming, the coming of 
the future for better or worse.
Along this line of thinking we are faced with a religion without 
religion (Derrida), a hope against hope (Paul), a desire beyond desire of so-
mething I know not what (Caputo). This is what Kierkegaard called faith 
- faith in something we cannot grasp or know, without certainties, beyond 
an economy of penalty and reward with ‘fear and trembling’, called forth 
by the commandment of love. To welcome what we cannot see coming, the 
stranger which might be the Devil or the Messiah, is what Derrida on the 
other hand called hospitality.
In this paper, I’m going to present a notion of hospitality in re-
lation to the discussion going on in the field of continental philosophy 
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of religion about khôra2. The aim is to trace hospitality to its topological 
core or the topos atopos of existence itself. 
Hospitality and Faith
What is hospitality then? According to Derrida, hospitality must be 
unconditional otherwise it is not hospitality. If we only welcome the ones 
we know, our friends, that means others are not invited, not welcome but 
excluded. That cannot be hospitality. If we invite the ones we don’t know 
but with a clause, a condition, a restriction it cannot be hospitality either. 
Why not? Because if we only welcome what we are ready to welcome, there 
is no hospitality. Hospitality presupposes a radical openness, hands down, 
a non- restricted non-prepared welcome of the stranger, the event or the 
wholly other (tout autre). It is not an invitation at all, but a visitation, a 
visitation without invitation! To welcome the uninvited other, the unfore-
seeable stranger without a horizon of expectation. That contains a certain 
risk, indeed, because we cannot see what or who is coming, what the result 
will be by receiving and hosting the unknown with open arms.  We do not 
know whether the stranger is a friend or foe. As Caputo says: “Should I 
answer an insistent and unexpected knock on my door in the middle of the 
night. Is that not the height of folly?” (Caputo 2016: 63). Yet, hospitality 
must be this unconditional welcome without the “must be”. Here, Derri-
da notes the etymological ambiguity in the word hospitality derived from 
Latin hostis, a stranger which might be hostile or a guest hôte in need 
of a host. So, the notion of both hôte (guest), host but also hostage and 
hostility is inscribed in the word hospitality which he captures with the 
neologism “hosti-pitality”(Derrida 2010: 401f). But is this kind of radical 
openness not impossible? Yes, it is! Of course, it is difficult to practice such 
a non-restricted openness. It sounds mad to welcome any one, especially 
after 9/11 (Caputo 2013: 263).
Further, the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws of con-
ditional hospitality i.e. the juridical-political setting in order to be concre-
te, effective otherwise it might risk to become utopian, abstract, illusory 
(Derrida 2000: 79). A negotiation between the two laws are required. But 
this relationship consists of aporia. The laws of conditional hospitality will 
secure that the one we welcome is identified and the stranger must state 
his/her intentions, pledge goodwill and fulfill certain obligations in order 
to stay. But this assurance that maintains the sovereignty of the host clas-
hes with what we understand by genuine hospitality – the unconditional 
[2] The terms khôra, khora, chora are used synonymously.
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welcome of the stranger. The very condition of  the possibility of hospita-
lity (juridico-political laws) becomes the very condition of its impossibility 
(unconditional welcome) (see Rubenstein 2008: 140f).
But unconditional hospitality is also impossible in a different sen-
se. Derrida: “the welcoming one asks for forgiveness, because one is always 
failing” (Derrida 2010: 380). We never give enough and we are never pre-
pared of welcoming the other, exactly because it is a visitation without 
expectation. The relation between host and guest in  terms of forgiveness is 
impossible because what has to be forgiven remains unforgivable, otherwi-
se it would not be necessary to forgive. It is about doing the impossible or 
the possibility of the impossible but as impossible i.e. to forgive what is not 
mine to forgive, forgive beyond me, to do something I cannot do. Only the 
other in me can forgive.
Forgiveness traverses the power of the I. This is called love which: 
“gives itself without giving anything else but itself” (Derrida 2010: 389). 
Said differently, a forgiveness is granted or takes place exactly there whe-
re nobody can forgive anyone: “the granting of a granted forgiveness, by an 
X, a great Third, God, if you will” (ibid. 397).
Now, the impossibility of welcoming the other, can be found in 
Kierkegaard’s notion of faith as well. It is expressed in the phrase: “the 
edifying in the thought that against God we are always in the wrong” (SKS 
3, 326). Derrida’s notion of hospitality has a lot in common with Kierke-
gaard’s notion of faith (see Rubenstein 2008: 174). But what is faith?
Faith is, Kierkegaard tells us, passion (lidenskab) and action 
(handling) or a “passionate act”, a p/act, we might say. Faith in what? Fai-
th in God! Then what is God? God is love. But love is nothing that grants 
absolute security or promise salvation by the end of good deeds done. It is 
not a teleological endgame providing keys to the kingdom in the afterlife. 
It is faith in something I cannot quite put my finger on, a radical hope be-
yond hope of something I know not what. I cannot know, since faith exact-
ly begins where reason ends. Faith traverses the sphere of the rational. 
Faith requires a radical openness and exposedness towards the unknown. 
It is comparable to Paul’s notion of “the power of the powerless” from the 
1. Corinthians (see Critchley 2012). It is a weak force. But faith  is not me-
rely passive i.e. to be open, receptive to whatever happens. It is hard work! 
It requires a lot to hold on to faith, to keep believing that the impossible 
might be possible in the face of pure tragedy. It is what God, or love, or 
“the commandment of love” demands nevertheless, unconditionally: “thou 
shalt love”. Faith is an unconditional response to an unconditional call.
Caputo links the response to the notion of hospitality or the event 
of hospitality. To respond to the call is at the same time to enter the king-
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dom of God. The kingdom is again nothing beyond, a VIP-lounge in the 
heavens with border patrols and guest lists. It is  right here! It is like, if 
everyone attended a dinner party, a wedding reception, not just friends 
and relatives, but the poor, the crippled, the lame and the blind. A descrip-
tion we find in the Gospels too (Luke 14: 12-14, Caputo 2007: 260). There is 
a certain madness and anarchy to it: “…mad as any hatter’s party attended 
by Alice” (ibid.). The kingdom is in the midst of all of us and vice versa. The 
key is to say “yes” or to put it more radically, it is an unconditional affirma-
tion without why. It is welcoming the other. In the kingdom, hospitality is 
a weak force, not invitations circulating back and forth within an economy 
of exchange (ibid. 262).
Now what interests me here is the connection between love and the 
topos atopos of this insecure exposedness. What are we dealing with here?
Love or Khôra?
In recent debates in continental philosophy of religion, the notion 
of khôra plays a crucial role. Khôra is a term Derrida uses as a surname for 
différance – “the play of differences”. It is a term he borrows from Plato’s 
Timaeus, though stripped for almost all of its platonic legacy. For Plato, 
khôra is this peculiar “place, space, receptacle, container, womb, nurse”, 
the triton genos in which paradigma unfolds and the cosmos is created. For 
Derrida, it has no cosmological status. Khôra isn’t really anything or it is 
not even possible to say that khôra is or is not, only “there is khôra”– (il 
y a khôra). Khôra is an outcast, an odd fish for it exceeds the polarity of 
both mythos and logos (Derrida 1995: 92). It is not even possible to grasp 
khôra through the metaphoric discourse of “womb, nurse, receptacle etc”. 
because the polarity between metaphorical sense versus proper sense is it-
self inscribed within khôra (ibid.). In this sense, khôra is a place-less place 
that gives place without actually giving anything – it oscillates between 
two types of oscillation: “the double exclusion (neither/nor) and the parti-
cipation (both this and that) (ibid. 91).
Now, here is a question from Derrida which echoes into the on-
going debate. Khôra is a place or a placeless place but is this place 
created by God, Derrida asks? Is it part of the play? Or else is it God 
himself, is it opened by God, by the name of God or by appeal by res-
ponse, the event that calls for response, or is it older than creation? Is 
it impassively foreign to all of this? (Derrida 1995: 75f). In short, “who 
are you, khôra?” or maybe more accurate “Where are you?” Do we have 
to choose between the two, God or Khôra? This is what Derrida calls 
“The test of khôra”. The question is rephrased by Caputo: “What is the 
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wholly other… God or Khora? What do I love when I love my God, God 
or Khora? How are we to decide? Do we have to choose?” (Caputo 1997: 
37). In a discussion of this very question, Richard Kearney suspects 
that Caputo is suggesting that we don’t, because the issue remains un-
decidable, but he disagrees (Kearney 2003: 110). We do have to choose, 
but he also understands khôra in a different way than Caputo does. 
For Kearney khôra is an abyss (see Kearney 2003, 2003b). In a more 
familiar language he says, khôra is experienced as misery, terror, loss 
and desolation: “Khora is Oedipus without eyes, Sisyphus in Hades, 
Prometheus in chains […] Khora is the tohu bohu before creation; it 
is Job in agony […] Jesus abandoned on the cross (crying out to the 
father) […] It is Conrad’s “heart of darkness”[…] Monte Christo’s pri-
son cell, Primo Levi’s camp” (Kearney 2003: 113). In short, khôra is an 
abysmal experience. In Anatheism (2010) However, Kearney underlines 
a different notion of khôra i.e. as the “womb of Mary”. In this sense, khôra is 
not merely a dark void, a monstrous abyss, but also an empty place where 
something can come to be, the nursing uterus that makes possible the in-
carnation.
Now, Caputo’s response is clear. For him, khôra is neither a mons-
ter nor an abyss. It is a sphere of ambiguity and undecidability within 
which the movement of faith is made, where God and khôra bleed into 
each other (Caputo 2013: 13). Khôra is not the black sheep because wi-
thout it there is no faith, only triumphalism, dogmatism and fundamen-
talism (Caputo 2003: 127). In Anatheism, we might add, Kearney seems to 
agree on this point. Without the gap, without khôra, there could be no love, 
no leap and no faith (Kearney 2010: 56).
In “Testing the heart of Khôra: Anonymous or Amorous?” (2010), 
James H. Olthuis pushes the question even further in his own appeal to 
Caputo. Why not think of khôra as a vulnerable womb-like matrix opened 
by appeal, by the God of love which is constantly bedeviled by the anony-
mous il y a (Olthuis 2010: 178)? Why not think of the relation between God 
and khôra as an amorous connection rather than an anonymous structure? 
Once again, Caputo’s answer is clear. Faith in love, in God, in the womb 
of love is “a movement made within the play of khôra/différance. It is not 
a structural feature of it as such” (Caputo 2010: 195). However, in The In-
sistence of God (2013), Caputo’s notion of khôra is further explicated in a 
more differentiated or conciliatory direction. He talks about insistence as 
a weak call harbored in the name of God. God is not a strong supreme be-
ing but a weak perhaps, a peut-être, a “may-be” which is at the same time 
also a “may-be not”. The name of God offers nothing but a hope, a prayer, a 
faith in something coming which might turn out to be a nightmare as well 
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as the opposite. Khôra is thought of as the very spacing of peut-être, the 
slash between maybe/maybe not (Caputo 2013: 13). Khôra is required for 
there to be a perhaps. What is the difference between khôra and perhaps?
Almost nothing (ibid. 267). Although “perhaps” is neither amorous 
nor indifferent but neutral, it “constantly verges on becoming uterine – 
ne uterine, like a womb, a primal place in which, from which existents 
emerge” (ibid. 259)”. This sounds a lot like khôra. Just after this passage, 
Caputo goes on to quote Derrida’s “test of khôra”. Is it the same? At least, 
the “perhaps” doesn’t seem to be completely foreign, neither to the primal 
womb- matrix (amorous?) nor to the abyss (monstrous?). What is it? Ca-
puto: “it is a kind of kin of the il y a (Levinas), the es gibt (Heidegger), of 
the tohu wa-bohu, a cousin/cousine of the tehom of Genesis” (ibid. 260). 
Is “perhaps” a kin of khôra as well or the other way around? If khôra is 
anything at all, it is a bastard of incestuous (non)relationships - the first 
“Snow” par excellence.
Now, this battle between love and Khôra and how they might be 
(dis)connected seems to echo the strife of anxiety, despair and melancholia 
on the one hand and faith and love on the other in Kierkegaard’s philoso-
phy of existence. Is the placeless place then the arena of a “pit-fight” or as 
Silesius expressed it – one abyss calling to the other?
Love and Khôra?
The notion of khôra is nowhere to be found in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, 
yet certain tropes and concepts come close, like the “instant” which David 
Kangas defines in the following sense: “Of itself it is nothing, it is nowhe-
re; it neither is, nor is not. And yet everything changes in the instant” 
(Kangas 2007: 4). Or it could be the abyssal fear and trembling, faith as 
passion without certainty experienced by Abraham (See Caputo 1997: 59, 
Kearney 2003: 117). Certain traces of what seems to be of a khôral kin can 
be found at the heart of the non-place place of the “movement at the spot” 
which Anti-Climacus is talking about, the fracture in the self-relation, the 
silence of the lilies of the field or this very field itself.
Originally, the word “khôra” signified a “field” or an “open region.” 
The field is a place for something to grow, a “rural womb” for something 
to blossom, not unlike the womb, nurse, receptacle of Plato’s khôra or the 
womb of Mary, the container of the uncontainable – the khora akhorathon. 
As a field, khôra is also opposed to the Polis, “the city state”and hence a 
place for beasts or gods. It both contains this notion of a place for things 
to grow, but also a certain exposedness, a dangerous  place, because out 
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in the open, one is vulnerable for predators and enemies. The notion of 
fertility and vulnerability, or the hospitable and the hostile is at play here. 
When Kierkegaard is talking about love, he is using this analogy of the 
silent work of nature hidden in the fields, beneath the cereal. This is what 
he calls edification.
It seems like Kierkegaard actually do reflect on khôra, though not 
by name (a point I shall return to) and God. What is the relationship be-
tween them? First of all, what is God? Kierkegaard gives us three main 
definitions:
1. God is love (Works of Love)
2. God is the middle-term (Works of Love)
3. God is that for God everything is possible (The Sickness unto Death)
The first definition “God is love” can be rephrased as “God is edi-
fication”. One of the first things Kierkegaard emphazises in The Works of 
Love is the ontological manifestation of love—love is. This “is” is further 
qualified as becoming. Love is becoming, yet God (or love) never changes. 
This is in some way tricky, because it is not some sort of process ontology. 
Love is also linked to the instant which isn’t a temporal category or process 
but the “atom of eternity”, the point where eternity crosses time (SKS 4, 
391). There seems to be “a play of differences” at stake here. The notion of 
the unchangeable becoming of love, considered along the line of the third 
definition – “for God everything is possible” really points to some sort of 
victorious God, a supreme Omnipotent creature, the mightiest of all kings 
– a king of trumps and triumphs – “thy will be done!” But this is slightly 
the case though. Kierkegaard explicitly rejects such a notion of God. There 
is something else going on. On the one hand, the instant is intense because 
everything changes in it. On the other hand, it is fragile, weak because 
it belongs to the realm of silence. One word is enough, and the instant is 
gone. The definition “God is that for God, everything is possible” points to 
an ontology not of actuality but of possibility – even a possibility of the im-
possible. The Being of love then seems to be closer to what Caputo has in 
mind, when defining God as “may-being” i.e. not in terms of “Omni-poten-
cy” but “Omni-possibilizing”. However, the second definition might blur 
things up. God is the middle-term [Mellem-bestemmelsen] (SKS 9, 111). 
God or love is between people, me and  my neighbor, a bond or relation, 
we could say. In ontological terms, we might recall Nancy’s qualification 
of Heidegger’s “Being-with” [Mit-sein]. In Being Singular Plural Nancy 
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remarks that God is Being-with or the togetherness of being-together of 
all that is (Nancy 2000: 60, 200n52) or God is the among or the with, 
the between of us (Nancy 2013: 30). God effaces himself or is himself the 
effacement. Mankind is on the other hand, the abandonment of God. This, 
however, does not mean to live in the absence of God but to affirm the 
effacement among us i.e. God is the among, this Nothing we share among 
us in neighboring (ibid.). This term could also be useful in order to inter-
pret Kierkegaard’s notion of the “Omni-presence” [Allestedsnærværelse] of 
God, not as pantheism, panpsychism or some sort of occassionalism but as 
Being-with, an ontological proximity that emphasizes existence as co-exis-
tence. Is the Being of love may-being (Caputo) or being-with (Nancy)? Is it 
neither of the two or both? Maybe something third?
First of all, that love is seems to stress a certain compliancy. Love 
is the deepest ground of spirit, Kierkegaard says. It seems to be before 
everything else, prior, an alpha-amorous we might say. Love’s address, 
the call or the commandment is something that doesn’t come into being 
in the second we respond or refuse the call. It is what we always already 
stand in a relation to and that which still remains even after being heard 
or answered. It insists and keeps on insisting. On the one hand, we must do 
what we cannot not-do (in Nancy’s terms) i.e. stand in a relation to the un-
conditional, that which calls upon us. On the other hand, we must do what 
we cannot do. To do the impossible that traverses the power of the I, what 
only the other in me can do i.e. love. It is the works of love, not the works of 
me! The response of faith seems to work at the borders of this “topological 
proximity” always on the edge of madness, at the rim of the abyss, upon 
the hyphen of a- topos or the slash between the possible/impossible within 
paradoxes, in the face of the khôral.
Love is a promise that cannot be fulfilled but nevertheless arrives 
as the promise and must be kept as the promise, not it’s content, but the 
utterance “I love you”, Nancy says (Nancy 2003: 265). It exposes the pro-
mise as such. Or to recall Derrida, love gives without giving anything but 
itself. With Caputo we might say, that God does not exist, but insists – not 
upon something in particular, but is itself insistence. For Kierkegaard, it is 
an insistence of love, made by love and even answered by love. Even thou-
gh love is Omni-present, it does not follow that it is revealed through and 
through. Love withdraws, its source is hidden in the ground, enveloped in 
secrecy and mystery. This is not some sort  of scanty attitude or arrogant 
denial, but a humble wish and prayer of love. Love is both hidden and 
revealed, it is and it becomes, it happens and it insists. It even traverses 
itself or (un)fold within itself, out, across, through itself as itself. It might 
be a bond, an inmaterial elasticity between different domains. The Danish 
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word Kjerlighed, as M. Jamie Ferreira has pointed out, is the word Kier-
kegaard uses to refer both to”(1) God as love, (2) The love placed in us by 
God, as well as (3) the neighbor-love we are commanded to express” (Fe-
rreira 2008: 107). Kierkegaard also refers to another triad of love in terms 
of edification i.e. “Love is the ground, the building and that which builds” (SKS 9, 218). 
In terms of hospitality, Derrida refers to the trinity in a similar threefold 
sense i.e. God is both guest, host and home. What then is this “placeless pla-
ce” or “place non-place” of the “taking place” of visitation or  edification?
In Reimagining the Sacred (2015) Kearney, in conversation with 
Vattimo, might give us a clue. It could be khôra. Kearneys ambition 
is hermeneutically to rethink the heart of chora. He talks about it 
in relation to the Trinity as the empty space which allows the three 
persons to constantly move: “So that the Trinity may be rethought 
as a constant dynamism of mobility and desire, giving something to 
the other from out of the place of nothing, from the free place one leaves 
open…” (Kearney 2015: 142)”. The topo-logic is a socio-logic or at least a 
granting, giving, leaving place for the other. The topo-logic is further a 
kairo-logic, an event: “Chora is the u-topos, where the topos of the Messiah 
may constantly arrive, promise, call, take place” (ibid. 253). Finally, the to-
po-logic is an audio- logic in terms of call and response. Kearney interprets 
the famous “esher ayeh esher”, Gods words to Moses on Mount Sinai in 
Exodus 3:14, not as “I am who am”, (ego sum qui sum) but “I am who may 
be”. According to Kearney, God is saying something like: “I cannot become 
fully embodied in the flesh of the world, unless you show up and answer 
my call “Where are you?” with the response” Here I am” (see Kearney 2001 
& 2006: 43)”.
Commonality vs. Otherness
Now, one final thing must be considered. How do we grasp the re-
lation to the other? Faith is an unconditional response to an unconditional 
call. What call? The call of the  commandment: “thou shalt love thy nei-
ghbor”. Of what does this relation consist, the relation to the other, thy 
neighbor? I am not talking about the ethical discussion  concerning the 
problems of preferential love vs. neighbor love, but the ontology or topo-
logy of this relation. The relationality is a topological proximity that does 
not merely begin in the relata between I and You. Love comes first. It calls 
upon, not an I but a You: “You shall love thy neighbor!”. Further, the Da-
nish word Næste is not literary the same as the English “neighbor”[Nabo], 
although both terms signify some sort of proximity. As Caputo notes, the 
word Næste does not refer to the nearest and dearest, but the next one i.e.: 
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“the next chap to come through the door, whoever that may be, hence an-
yone, everyone” (Caputo 2008: 97). Ferreira makes a similar observation 
but stresses the point  of proximity as well – the neighbor is the one next 
and near to me, though not in terms of preferential love (Ferreira 2001: 
261). The next also points to some sort of inexhaustibility of whom to love. 
The next is not a chosen one, but is in Kierkegaard’s terms each [Alle] and 
every one [Enhver] (SKS 9, 74). There is no telos of love because there 
will always be someone next. The other is both (an)other (and another, 
and another…) and the wholly other. The opposite of the neighbor’s “each 
and every one” would be what Kierkegaard calls the crowd [Mængden] or 
audience [Publikum] i.e. each [Alle] and no one [Ingen] not unlike Heideg-
ger’s das Man. The proximity of the neighbor and the ‘you’ called forth can 
be found in Kierkegaard’s idea of hiin Enkelte. Hiin Enkelte does not only 
refer to “the individual” or “the one”, but is characterized exactly along the 
same line as the neighbor i.e. as each [Alle] and every one [Enhver]. We 
might say when the call addresses a “You” it really puts someone on the 
spot, “you” not any one, “you”! But even here, we are still in a tension be-
tween the onymous and the anonymous. The address is directed to a speci-
fic someone, but this someone is still everyone, any one - the second-person 
singular “you”. Rather than an I doing something (love is not a property), 
it is first of all a you called forth within this topological proximity. Fur-
thermore, love is the middle-term, the being-with on a social-ontological 
level. On the other hand, it is between the you and the neighbor. There is 
still a distance i.e. there cannot be a direct access to the other. In this sen-
se, the other is still other.
Let’s rephrase it in the words of James Wirth: “Where is the nei-
ghbor when the neighbor is everywhere and thereby nowhere? On the one 
hand, it is nowhere in specific, for the wholly other is, as Derrida tells us, 
wholly other – tout autre est tout autre! On the other hand, every other – tout 
autre – is wholly other” (Wirth 2004: 220). The You and the other has this 
“nothing” in common – this  “no-where” the indeterminable placeless place 
withdrawn from any map. That is the topological proximity of you and thy 
neighbor.
What then, crosses what cannot be crossed? What gives without gi-
ving anything but  itself? What does that which cannot be done neither by 
you nor by anyone else? What is the bond? It is love. Love is both a proxy 
(a vicarious taking place) within this nothing, no- where, placeless-place 
(where no one can forgive any one) and this very proximity (common near-
ness and distance) itself. What does love do? It edifies! (SKS 9, 220). Love 
and edification are the same. How so?
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According to Caputo, the Danish Kjerlighed is derived from the 
Latin charitas by way of the French cher which means “the love of God” 
or in Greek agape (Caputo 2008: 97). Ferreira notes that the Danish noun 
Kjerlighed doesn’t have a verb and while this is true, it is related to the 
verb  kere2  i.e. “to show love [kærlighed]” related to the English care and 
the Latin cura. However, Kierkegaard uses the verb elske. It says: “Thou 
shall love [elske] thy neighbor”. Elske is related to erotic love [Elskov] al-
though erotic love and neighbor-love are two very different things. Elske 
also has a different meaning. The word is derived from the Old Nordic 
elska related to the Indo-European root ala “nourish, raise [nære, opfos-
tre]” (Becker-Christensen 2005: 331) or” grow, feed, create [avle, give føde, 
frembringe] (Jonsson 1863: 14). To love [elske], to edify simply means to 
“nourish, nurse, make something grow, come into being”. Further, Kier-
kegaard uses the word “nourishment” [Naering] related to “near” [Naer] 
that works within this topological proximity of you and thy neighbor i.e. 
“the one next and near” as well. It is remarkable that the word elske bears 
all these connotations of caring, growing, nourish which, as we have seen 
in some interpretations, was linked to khôra as well. It really emphasizes 
the khôral as something “womb-like”, a uterus within which love calls for-
th existence by nourishment, edification. The topological proximity, the 
relation between you and neighbor with love as the middle-term could look 
like this:
The Danish “kere” is etymologically linked to the German kehren 
“turn” but means “to show love” or less strongly “to show concern, solicitu-
de” or “to worry”. While the verb “kære”, which actually has an etymologi-
cal connection with the English “care” and hence an obvious candidate for 
kærlighed in  verbal form, it does not connote anything in that direction, 
but is a juridical term for “appeal”– an appeal to the court. However, kere 
does have a semantic similarity with the English care and the Latin cura.
Love is hidden in the ground, concealed, yet it is placed within 
“you”, within each of us, within the human being and it is among us, it is 
what is “common” and it marks the relation as such. But the you and the 
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neighbor are not two opposite poles in a static relation in need of bridging. 
The ‘you’ is also already itself a neighbor and whoever is someone’s neigh-
bor is a ‘you’ addressed by love. Hence, khôra might not be this “interface” 
i.e. the circle penetrated by God, but rather the irreducible relationality 
i.e. the placeless place in these spherical crossings of the topological proxi-
mity. This dynamic common ‘nothing’ exposed is itself khôral and could 
look like this: 
You1 relates to neighbor1 and you2 to neighbor2. But the ‘you’ is 
also already a (neighbor) and vice versa. This irreducibility of what is 
common between you and the neighbor is what we share, our Being-wi-
th. Nancy expresses it like this: “… I think that the “nearest” is abso-
lutely not the nearest in any sense of neighborhood, nor the nearest 
by place (…) The nearest is everybody, to the extent that everybody 
shares with me the same impossibility of being or becoming the fixed 
enunciation of a certain position” (Nancy 2001: 3). For Kierkegaard, 
the “each and every one” that holds for you and the neighbor in ter-
ms of hiin Enkelte is this shared instability of any fixed position. The 
khôral is both (1) this inter-sphere crossed by the circles i.e. love, (2) the 
very slash between you and the neighbor (being-with, the each and every 
one), (3) the withdrawal of love and (4) the non- certitude of how this work 
of love will work out. Further, the intersection of you-neighbor is very close 
to what Nancy calls the singular plural. In Latin, the word singuli already 
refers to the plural because it designates “one” i.e. “one by one” (among 
others) and the term plus means “more” i.e. more than one (Nancy 2000: 
32, 39). The singular plural is the with in Being-with, the co- in co-existen-
ce or existence is co-existence, Being is Being- with3. This is illustrated in 
the following pictogram.
[3] In The Concept of Anxiety, V. Haufniensis makes a similar point in his description of the relation be-
tween Adam and the subsequent individual. Adam is both himself and the race which holds for  every other 
as well: “man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race (SKS4, 335)”. Existence is 
co-existence in this socio-historical sense.
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Instead of a hostility inscribed in the very hospitable relation be-
tween I-you i.e. the indeterminable character of the other – friend or foe, 
Kierkegaard emphasizes a fragility and vulnerability in this moment of 
intersection, the event where the instant is filled by  the expression of love. 
The vulnerability is inscribed within the event itself and not so much in 
a friend/foe uncertainty. The risk of failure and catastrophe depends just 
as  much in the response of the “you” and not in the unknown motives of 
the other. Love doesn’t begin by such worry or possible divisions. It exposes 
first of all what is common, an ontology of equality before the unconditio-
nal. Yet, it is an asymmetrical or vicarious relation of you-God-neighbor, 
not I-you. But how this exposure will turn out when responded to is mar-
ked by perhaps. It might work out to answer the call of the other, it might 
not. There is always a khôral tension between call and response.
Khôral Love?
Now, let us return to the central issue once more: the relation be-
tween love and khôra in  the event of hospitality or the passionate act (p/
act) of faith. Let’s be straight: Khôra is no love of mine nor does Khôra love 
me. It doesn’t care about any one - you, the neighbor, the other. It doesn’t 
give a damn or it isn’t even possible to say whether it cares or doesn’t care, 
because it is not a subject that does anything. However, withdrawn into 
untranslatability, what does Kierkegaard’s khôral dimensions of existence 
tell us? Is the absence of khôra, the not-mentioning of khôra in the texts 
not the most radical way to demonstrate its anonymity? If it really is so 
anonymous, it cannot even be named! Il y a  khôra is already to state too 
much! “Il y a khôra” might be cut down neither to “il y a” nor simply “il”-
but, . What we get is merely khôral fumes, notes, sandstorms blowing 
from the desert hopefully with hidden seeds among the grains, bastards of 
the bastard to end all bastards!
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Yet, if we search within the oeuvre, we hit upon a description very 
close to what could be called khôra or a khôral stretch. By the end of Re-
petition, Constantin Constantius states: “long live dancing in the eddy of 
the infinite. Long live the wave that drives me down into the abyss. Long 
live the wave that slings me up again over the stars” (SKS 3, 88). This 
could be “the sphere of undecidability”, the “spacing of peut-être,” in terms 
of a hydro-fluidity, khôral splashes inscribed within the absent khôra. Is 
existence the movement of the waves, dancing in the eddy with no cho-
reography, but a chora- graphy of seismographic imprints caused by the 
very movement of existence itself – between “calling forth” and “stepping 
out” (from Latin existere) – the Bewegt-heit of be- coming? Maybe existence 
consists of such fluidity? Like Irigaray asked, “of what is Being? Of Air!” 
(Irigaray 1999: 4-5). We might ask, “of what is existence?” Of water? Of 
elements maybe? Caputo asks a similar question, when considering the 
myth of creation – of what are we made of? Maybe, he says, being the 
image of God is compatible with: “being made out of some sort of unima-
ginable khoral corporeality (khora-poreality) and that we are  the stuff of 
some sort of khoral incarnation? Suppose our corporeal being is deeply 
interwoven with, or immersed in, these wild, watery, and windy condi-
tions?” (Caputo 2006: 60). The topology might be a hydro-logy or at least 
a poetics of meteors (atmospheric phenomena), of foam-born bastards. It 
might be, that such khôral orphans are constantly adopted by love, nursed 
by love unconditionally without any rock-solid guarantees of  how this 
work of love will work out. These are the khôral prints and marks we find 
in Kierkegaard’s texts, the effects of nothing from no-where, scouted by 
love on the dancefloor of the eddy, between the slings of the waves! Are we 
then khora-poreal beings neither living in chaos nor in cosmos but in what 
Joyce called chaosmos? And do the address, the event take place within 
this? Make no mistakes, we are not merely left  within a void or seized 
by the unconditional only. That is why it is important also to  stress this 
(cor)poreal dimension, what Kierkegaard or Anti-Climacus called body or 
necessity as opposed to possibility. Or to recall Derrida, the negotiation 
between the laws of conditional hospitality and unconditional hospitality.
As I mentioned above, a profound candidate for the verb Kjer-
lighed in Danish could be kere as related to care and the Latin Cura. 
Now, could it be, that existence, as this openness, might neither be 
about khôra nor Cura, but “Khûra”- a neologism, like Joyce’s “chaos-
mos”, Derrida’s “hosti-pitality” and Caputos “khora-poreality? A place 
non-place where the amorous can and does take place within the anon-
ymous womb, but without settling or getting too comfort, - like the kni-
ght of faith who is constantly in a tension? A tension, that shatters the 
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slash between maybe/maybe not to the extent that it forms a vibrant X, 
that puts “you” (X) on the spot…, the one addressed and called forth by 
love, the mark/de-mark, sign/de-sign in the (a)topography of existence? 
Could it be the elasticity/fluidity of stepping out, the resonate space 
of call and response4, the reverberating axis between what we might 
call the khôra-chaosmic f/act and the khûra- poreal p/act of existen-
ce within which we welcome the other unconditionally, but without 
any support of a sovereign power to sanction possible rejections? Love 
doesn’t force, Kierkegaard says, but has faith in everything, it hopes 
everything: “Kjerlighed Troer Alt og Kjerlighed haaber Alt […] og […] 
Ved Tilgivelse skjuler Kjerlighed Syndernes Mangfoldighed (SKS9, 291)”– 
Amen!
Conclusion
Who do I love in the event of hospitality, in the p/act of faith – God 
or khôra? The other, my neighbor? This question rises in the face of the 
death of the supreme God. A high degree of uncertainty and undecidability 
hovers like a spook, (a (w)ho(l)ly g/host?) over the onto-theological grave-
yard. But it is not a gorgon, not the triumphal progress of the nihil, but the 
necessary condition of faith and love, the possibility to rethink God after 
the death of God in terms of a weak call. The exposure of the uncertain is 
of a khôral kin, a tomb-womb relationship. This event of an unconditional 
response to an unconditional call is what Derrida called hospitality and 
Kierkegaard faith. For Derrida, hospitality means welcoming an uninvi-
ted stranger, the unforeseeable other, unconditionally. For Kierkegaard, 
faith is a passionate act of love i.e. to nourish, edify the love within the 
other unconditionally. Both terms seem to grabble with the impossible and 
the possibility of the impossible on several levels. Further, this uncertain-
ty in the event of hospitality marks the double notion of hostis, a hostile or 
a guest in need of a host. In the instant of love, the uncertainty points to 
a fragility and a vulnerability in the event as such. With Kierkegaard, we 
get a notion not of khôra but the khôral, the fractured sediments within 
this placeless place, that love constantly interrupts and shatters. It is a 
topological proximity of relations working on borders, in-between spheres 
- the reverberating space  of call and response, in the eddy of the infinite 
[4] In his reading of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love (SKS 9, 377), Critchley defines God as an “echo chamber” 
where each sound even the slightest is a repetition that resounds back into the subject’s ears with the intensi-
fication of infinity (Critchley 2012: 251). We might even say that the stretch of the khôral is at stake here as well, 
between being both lonely and social i.e. within a shared world of the each and everyone, and neither isolated nor merely a product 
of social conditions i.e. being the two and being irreducible to either of the two. This is the shared being-with.
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chora-graphy. We are kept in the tension between God and khôra, anxiety 
and faith, the hostile and the hospitable, without certainties but with the 
power of the powerless, a hope against hope, a possibility of the impossi-
ble, the address of love, a chance, a prayer.
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